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CURRENT CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE AND STATE POLICE POWER, 1922-1927t
By THOMAS REED POWELL*
II.

B

STATE POLICE POWER

AFTER

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

the Supreme Court worked out its elastic formulae to
clothe conclusions as to the validity of state interferences with
interstate commerce in the absence of congressional action, the
Great Chief Justice had strained hard to find in congressional
action a barrier to the application to interstate navigation of a
state-granted monopoly in the use of steam on vessels65 and a
negative on a state tax on the occupation of selling imported goods
in the original package ir which they had been received from
abroad."' From the beginning there was no doubt that state regulation in conflict with congressional regulation is to be denied
application. Marshall's astuteness in finding such conflicts need
no longer be emulated now that his successors have established
that state legislation consistent with national regulation is still void
if the national government is deemed to have intended to occupy
the whole field within which the state legislation operates.
Whether Congress means merely to command what it commands
or means to go further and enjoin any state additions to its commands is seldom to be gathered from explicit language in federal
statute. The answer usually is derived from a process called
inference. Formally the enterprise is one of the interpretation
of the Act of Congress to discover its scope. Actually it is often
the enterprise of reaching a judgment whether the situation is so
adequately handled by national prescription that the impediment
of further state requirements is to be deemed a bane rather than
a blessing.
The process is not different from that practiced in passing on
state laws in the absence of federal action. The difference lies
in the data to which the process is applied. When national power
has not been exerted, the court faces the alternative of allowing
the state restraint or leaving the commerce in question unfettered.
EFORE

*Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass.
MINNEsOTA LAW REvIEw 321, 470.
65Gibbons v. Ogden, (1824) 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 1, 6 L. Ed. 23.
66Brown v. Maryland, (1827) 12 Wheat. (U.S.) 419, 6 L. Ed. 678.
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After Congress has imposed a partial restraint, the issue is
changed to one of whether this partial restraint has sufficiently
safeguarded the situation so that further restraints have less justification. Some restraint may be thought sufficient where no restraint would be deemed undesirable. This way of putting the
problem assumes that we always have a defined subject matter
involved, such as bridges, trains, rates, liabilities, etc. Often, however, there is question as to what subject Congress has regulated,
e. g., whether trains or merely rear cars on trains,8 7 whether rates
alone or liabilities as well 6 8 etc. The state may claim that its
law deals with a different subject from that regulated by Congress.
If its claim were accepted, the court would be choosing between
the state's regulation of that subject and no regulation. The claim
may be rejected by the judicial process of choosing to find that
Congress meant to legislate about genera when its prescriptions
touched only species. In such cases a decision that the state law
must be denied application because Congress has entered the field
may often be more realistically expressed as a judgment that the
state regulation is worse than no regulation. The Act of Congress
may be the peg on which the court hangs the decision, but the
process of finding in the Act of Congress a negative that is not
there expressed must often be much the same as the process of
finding in the constitution a negative that is not there expressed.
These ruminations will, I am sure, be as clear to my readers
as they are to me. If the effort shows that generalization is
difficult and precarious, it will not have been in vain. It may be
better and simpler to suggest as a psychological consideration that
the local need for regulation is likely to appeal less strongly after
Congress has turned its attention in the general direction of the
situation than before Congress has noted the existence of evils at
all. While no member of the national legislature may have thought
of the particular problem presented by state additions to national
regulations and have desired that the national prescriptions be the
sole ones in the field, it may often be a reasonable assumption that
Congress would itself have gone farther if there had been any
67See the difference of opinion in Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Public
Service Commission, (1919) 250 U. S. 566, 40 Sup. Ct. 36, 63 L. Ed.

1142, reviewed in 19 Mich. L. Rev. 27, and commented on in 5 Va.
L. Reg.
n. s. 719 and 29 Yale L. J. 456.
68

See Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Warren-Goodwin Lumber
Co., (1919) 251 U. S. 27, 40 Sup. Ct. 69, 64 L. Ed. 118, reviewed in
19 Mich. L. Rev. 27-28 and discussed in 33 Harv. L. Rev. 988; 14
Ill.. L. Rev. 525; 5 Iowa L. B. 280; 18 Mich. L. Rev. 418; 4 MINNESOTA
LAw REvimw 293; 68 U. Pa. L. Rev. 259; and 29 Yale J. L. 566.
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serious need for something more. Still stronger presumptions are
legitimate when Congress has vested an administrative authority
with power in the premises. New administrative regulations
come more easily than additional legislation. Local needs have
less claim to protection from state regulation when they may present those claims to a federal board than when they must rely on
Congress if state comfort is denied. Most of the cases to be
catalogued relate to matters over which some federal administrative agency has been vested with some degree of control. Sometimes the question involved in this section as in its predecessor is
whether the commerce involved is intrastate or interstate. This,
however, is not coterminous with the question whether Congress
has validly regulated the subject-matter, since the Transportation
Act has spread its wings or fangs to a considerable extent over
intrastate commerce.
Of the thirty-one cases to be presented, all but five deal with
interstate carriers by rail. The remainder have to do with navigable waters, quarantine, daylight saving, and title to ships.
1. CARRIERS
Rates. The Transportation Act of 1920, in dealing with the
cessation of the federal control of carriers which had been exercised under the war power, provided that all rates, classifications,
regulations and practices in effect on February 20, 1920, "shall
continue in force and effect until thereafter changed by state or
federal authority, respectively, or pursuant to authority of law,"
with a proviso against changes prior to September 1, 1920, which
should reduce any rate, fare or charge. The question in Missouri
Pacific R. Co. v. Boone69 was whether a state statute passed prior
to the assumption of federal control, concededly suspended even
as to intrastate commerce by the filing of tariffs by the director
general during federal control, became operative again as to intrastate commerce without re-enactment after the limitation in the
Transportation Act had expired. In holding that it did, Mr.
Justice Brandeis had to hold that the tariff instituted, by the director general had been "changed" by the "mere cessation of the
suspension, which had been effected through federal control," of
the state statute in force and applicable to intrastate commerce
prior to the assumption of federal control. Such a change was
said to be one made "thereafter" in the language of the Trans09(1926) 270 U. S. 466, 46 Sup. Ct. 341, 70 L. Ed. 688.
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portation Act, i. e., after the termination of federal control. This
verbal tour de force was plainly dictated by considerations of policy
and of constitutional canons. Concededly the state might by a
new statute or by fresh administrative action after September 1,
1920, restore the statutory liability for loss of baggage in intrastate commerce which had been in force prior to federal control.
Yet if the state administrative authority were not vested with appropriate authority and if the state legislature were not in session,
the restoration of earlier state regulation would necessarily be
deferred. This point is made in answer to the contention of the
carrier that Congress intended the tariffs of the director general
to remain in force until new affirmative state action, so as to present an obstacle to any change which might reduce the carrier's
revenue. "It is not to be assumed," says Mr. Justice Brandeis,
"that Congress intended to adopt a means of protection which
would have been indirect, fortuitous, and largely, futile, and which
would obviously have produced such inequalities among the states,
when direct, certain and better means of protection were available." On the question of constitutional power, it was argued by
the shipper that the contention of the carrier meant that Congress
had repealed state laws applicable to intrastate commerce at the
termination of federal control and then given to the states permission to legislate anew on the subject. Such regulation by Congress of intrastate commerce would, it was urged, go beyond the
limited congressional power to regulate intrastate commerce only
so far as is necessary and proper in order adequately to regulate
interstate commerce. Without definitely passing on the issue, Mr.
Justice Brandeis declared that such a construction of the Transportation Act would "raise a grave and doubtful constitutional
question" and that "under the settled practice, a construction
which does so will not be adopted, where some other is open to
us." Thus did the Supreme Court supplement the work of the
congressional draftsman and make it clear that Congress meant
state laws to apply to intrastate commerce as soon as the transition
period after federal control had elapsed. The case at bar sustained the state court in applying to intrastate commerce a state
statute forbidding limitation of liability for loss of baggage when
the loss is due to a failure to deliver which the state law deems a
conversion.
The same provision of the Transportation Act was successfullf invoked in New York Central R. Co. v. New York & Penn-
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sylvania Co. 7 0 to defeat what was in effect a state reduction of
intrastate rates during the six months period ending September
1, 1920, in defiance of the explicit proviso in the federal Act.
The carrier had exacted the rates in force when the Transportation Act was passed. It fiad not appealed from an order of the
state commission establishing a lower rate, but it now resists a
judgment on a reparation order issued by the state commission.
The state court held that the carrier had waived its rights by its
failure to appeal from the rate order. In reversing the state judgment, Mr. Justice Holmes says:
"In our opinion the failure to appeal from the former order
is no bar. We do not undertake to review the decision of the
supreme court as to state procedure, but if the railroads were
too late to argue their case before that court, they are not too late
to argue it here. There was no order in the former hearing before
the state commission that the railroads could have brought before
us. This is the first moment when they have had a chance to
raise what we regard as a perfectly clear point, as it is the first
moment when their rights have been infringed. There now is an
order which is in the teeth of the statute. It would not be reasonable to hold that they are precluded from getting the protection
that this court owes them, by their having failed to go as far as
they now learn that they might have gone in a previous state proceeding which did not infringe their rights and which could not
be brought here."
The familiar question whether a shipment is a single interstate
one or a combination of an interstate and an intrastate one arose
in Baltivwre & 0. S. W. R. Co. v. Settle"- in which it was conceded by the shipper that his intention from the beginning was
to ship to the ultimate destination. Mr. Justice Brandeis recognized that, if the shipper's intention had been in doubt, the facts
that he had taken possession of the cars at an intermediate point
to which they were billed and that they were not rebilled for
several days thereafter might have justified the jury in finding
that the intention was to end the original journey at the first billing point and that the later rebilling was an afterthought. There
may be instances "where a local shipment follows quickly upon an
interstate shipment and yet is not to be deemed part of it, even
70(1926) 271 U. S. 124, 46 Sup. Ct. 447, 70 L. Ed. 865. -Mr. Justice

Sutherland did not sit.
73(1922) 260 U. S. 166, 43 Sup. Ct. 28, 67 L. Ed. 189, noted in 23
Colum. L. Rev. 308; 36 Harv. L. Rev. 339; and 71 U. Pa. L. Rev. 132.
In 6 Boston U. L. Rev. 278 is a consideration of rates when intrastate transportation follows an interstate movement, and in 74 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 390 a discussion of when stoppage breaks the continuity of
interstate transit.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

though some further shipment was contemplated when the original
movement began." Here, however, the "essential nature of the
traffic as a through movement to the point of ultimate destination
is shown by the original and persisting intention of the shippers,
which was carried out." This as a matter of law determines that
the movement was a single interstate shipment, to which "neither
through billing, uninterrupted movement, continuous possession
by the carrier, nor unbroken bulk is an ssential." This case, more
determining whether shipments formally bisected are to be treated
clearly than any other, makes intention the controlling factor in
as nevertheless single shipments. Mr. Justice Brandeis insists
that previous decisions are consistent with this, though the opinions
may contain expressions which must be qualified. That the issue
was not free from doubt may be inferred from the fact that the
circuit court of appeals and Mr. Justice McReynolds differed from
the majority of the Supreme Court. With the shipment authoritatively determined to be a single interstate one, it followed that
the shipper was not entitled to the lower rates which he had paid
for an initial interstate shipment and a subsequent local one and
that he may be compelled to pay to the carrier the excess required
-to meet the established interstate charge from the point of origin
to the ultimate destination. While presumably the result might
have been the same had the Interstate Commerce Commission not
regulated the interstate rate, since the state cannot regulate interstate rates even in the absence of federal regulation, Mr. Justice
Brandeis rests the case on conflict between state and federal regulation when he says that "to permit carriers' revenues from inintrastate rates the carrier should get the Commission to remove
intermediate rates would be no less inconsistent with the provisions
and purposes of the Act to Regulate Commerce than to permit
them to be used as a means of discrimination."
An order of a state railroad commission suspending a tariff
for intrastate rates which the carrier had filed was contested in
72
Arkansas Railroad Commission v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co.
on the assumption that the Interstate Commerce Commission had
in effect found that these intrastate rates were prejudicial to interstate commerce, but the Supreme Court through Mr. Justice
Brandeis found that the assumption was unwarranted and therefore reversed an injunction decree obtained by the carrier against
the state commission. The intrastate rates had earlier been raised
72(1927) 274 U. S. 597, 47 Sup. Ct. 724, 71 L. Ed. 1224.
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to comply with an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission
which had directed that certain interstate rates should not be higher
for equal distance than the intrastate rates over the distance in
question. Later in another proceeding these interstate rates had
been raised by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Thereupon
the carrier sought to raise again its intrastate rates on the assumption that the previous order that the interstate rates should not
be higher than the intrastate rates required the local rates to ascend pari passu with any ordered raise of interstate rates. The
trouble with this assumption was that in the proceedings in which
the Interstate Commerce Commission ordered the raising of the
interstate rates it expressly refused to order the raising of these
intrastate rates while ordering such a raise of some intrastate
rates in other states. Mr. Justice Brandeis told the carrier that
in cases of doubt as to the bearing of the Commission's order on
intrastate rates the carrier should get the Commission to remove
the doubt before proceeding to raise such rates.
Concededly confiscatory intrastate rates on logs which had been
sustained by the state court on the ground that they should be
considered not by themselves but in connection with the interstate
rates on the lumber manufactured from the logs were declared
offensive to the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment in
3
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Public Service Commission
in which Mr. Justice Butler observed that "the carriers cannot
maintain interstate lumber rates higher than otherwise justified
by showing that they suffer loss or have inadequate returns from
the intrastate transportation of logs" and that "the state has no
power to require petitioners to haul the logs at a loss, or without
compensation that is reasonable and just, eien if they receive adequate revenues from the intrastate log haul and the interstate
lumber haul taken together." The Interstate Commerce Commission had authorized but not ordered a reduction of interstate log
rates, whereupon the state commission first authorized and then
ordered the reduction of corresponding intrastate log rates on the
assumption that this order was "in accordance with the findings of
the Interstate Commerce Commission." In finding this assumption erroneous and in holding the rate reduction an offense against
the fourteenth amendment, Mr. Justice Butler indicates that the
same result might have been reached under the commerce clause
when he says:
73(1927) 274 U. S. 344, 47 Sup. Ct. 604, 71 L. Ed. 1085.
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"As the findings of the Interstate Commerce Commission in
1922 do not expressly relate to intrastate rates, they are to be
deemed to apply exclusively to interstate commerce .

. .

. The

findings of the Interstate Commerce Commission permitting reductions of interstate rates did not justify respondent in declining
to proceed to a hearing or in adopting such findings as the basis
of its order. And, as no reduction of the corresponding interstate
log rates has been made by the Interstate Commerce Commission,
the respondent's order destroys the relation between the
74 intrastate and the interstate log rates in the same territory.
Facilities and Service. Powers vested by the Transportation Act
in the Interstate Commerce Commission to order joint use by
several carriers of the existing terminal facilities of one of them,
to control the extension and acquisition of new lines and the issue
of new securities were held in Railroad Commission of California
v. Southern Pacific Co. 75 to deprive a state commission of power
to order three systems of interstate railroads to construct in Los
Angeles, California, a wholly new union station and connecting
tracks which would cost in excess of $25,000,000. It is recognized
that the Act still leaves the states with power to order local rearrangements and minor track modifications for the promotion of
local safety and convenience provided the expense involved will
not impair the ability of the carriers to perform their duty to the
public.
Such local arrangements were involved in the order of a state
commission to continue to furnish switching service on an industrial siding which was sustained in Western & Atlantic R. v.
Georgia Public Service Commissiont M in which Mr. Chief Justice

Taft pointed out that the Transportation Act provides that the
authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission "over the ex74
For other considerations of state power over rates, see S. S.
Gregory, "Some Phases of Public Utility Law," 45 Rep. Am. Bar.
Ass'n 447; Hugh Gordon, "Preservation of Balance Between Federal
and State Powers of Public Utility Regulation," 47 Rep. Am. Bar.
Ass'n 661; and notes in 36 Harv. L. Rev. 757 on power of state court
over rates prior to action by the Interstate Commerce Commission,
in 3 Tex. L. Rev. 204 and 73 U. Pa. L. Rev. 210 on case holding state
rates cannot apply to a telegram between points in the same state
over a route partly in another state, and- in 73 U. Pa. L. Rev. 441
on case holding that state cannot regulate rates for use of an interstate bridge.
75(1923) 264 U. S. 331, -44 Sup. Ct. 376, 68 L. Ed. 713. The
decision in the state court is' treated in 12 Calif. L. Rev. 221, and a
decision sanctioning the power of the state to compel interstate roads
to construct a union station is noted in 10 Va. L. Rev. 238. Power
of the state to order interstate roads to construct passenger sheds is
conside'ed in 37 Harv. L. Rev. 888, 919.
78(1925) 267 U. S. 493, 45 Sup. Ct. 409, 69 L. Ed. 753.
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tension or abandonment of interstate railway lines shall not extend to the construction of spur, industrial or side tracks." This
express caveat in the federal statute rendered it immaterial that
eighty-five per cent of the traffic over the industrial track in question was interstate. To the complaint that the continuance of the
service would violate the Interstate Commerce Act as unduly discriminatory, the Chief Justice answered that such a complaint
must first be made to the Interstate Commerce Commission which
may, if it finds discrimination, designate some other remedy than
7
the discontinuance of the service in issue.
On the other hand, the requirement or approval of physical connections between different interstate railroads was held in Alabama
& V. R. Co. v. Jackson& E. R. Co."' to have been taken from the
states and vested in the Interstate Commerce Commission by the
Transportation Act of 1920. The paragraphs relied on by Mr. Justice Brandeis in support of this conclusion were ones vesting in the
Commission power to authorize constructions or extensions of lines
and power to require a carrier to extend its line or lines or to require
one such carrier to permit another to use its terminal facilities "including main-line track or tracks for a reasonable distance outside
such terminal." The limitation on the Commission's power with
respect to "spur, industrial, team, switching or side tracks" was
held not to cover such a junction between two main lines as that
here involved. Mr. Justice Brandeis refers to an earlier case
sanctioning such state power as was here exercised, but points out
that since then the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission have been greatly enlarged. He concedes that "none of the
amendments in specific terms confer upon the Commission exclusive power over physical connections between railroads engaged
in interstate commerce," but nevertheless insists that "it is clear
77In Lawrence v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry. Co., (1927) 274
U. S. 588, 595, 47 Sup. Ct. 720, 71 L. Ed. 1219, considered in note
80 infra, it is stated that "it was said in Western & A. R. Co. v.

Georgia Pub. Serv. Commission, supra, that a law of a state may be

valid which prohibits an important change in local transportation
conditions without application to the state commission, although the
ultimate authority to determine whether the change could or should
be made may rest with the federal commission." This appears to
go beyond anything said in the case with explicit reference to interstate commerce, but presumably it may be taken as an indication that
the court or some of its members sanction state laws forbidding
interstate carriers to do of their own initiative and without sanction
of the Interstate Commerce Commission what they may do without
leave of the state if they first secure the consent of the federal Commission.
78(1926) 271 U. S. 244, 46 Sup. Ct. 535, 70 L. Ed. 928.
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that the comprehensive powers conferred extend to junctions between main lines like those here in question." The decision reversed the judgment of a state court which had approved the order
of a state commission authorizing one carrier to exercise the right
of eminent domain to secure a connection with the tracks of another.
A contention by the state of Colorado that the Interstate Commerce Commission is without authority to issue a certificate permitting the abandonment of a branch line wholly within the state
and physically detached from the interstate lines of the owning
interstate carrier was rejected in Colorado v. United States in a
proceeding brought by the state to set aside the order of the
Commission. In the case at bar the state had not itself issued any
order to the carrier but had confined itself to protesting against
the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission; but the decision sustaining the order of the Commission necessarily involves
the conclusion that the state power to compel continuance of intrastate service on such a branch line is subordinate to the power
of the Commission to permit abandonment. The details of the
situation before the court are more appropriately considered in a
review of cases on the power of Congress, but it may be noted
that Mr. Justice Brandeis lays down that the power of the federal Commission to sanction abandonment is not conditioned upon
findings that continued operation would result in discrimination
against interstate commerce or in a denial of just compensation for
the use of the carrier's property in intrastate commerce or in interstate and intrastate commerce combined. "The sole test prescribed is that abandonment be consistent with public necessity
and convenience."80
79(1926) 271 U. S. 153, 46,Sup. Ct. 452, 70 L. Ed. 878, noted in
15 Georg. L. J. 63. The Transportation Act had earlier been construed not to apply to the abandonment of the intrastate service on
a road not connected with any interstate road by common ownership. See Texas v. Eastern Texas R. Co., (1922) 258 U. S. 204, 42
Sup. Ct. 281, 66 L. Ed. 566, stated in 21 Mich. L. Rev. 179 and considered in 1 Tex. L. Rev. 97 and 2 Tex. L. Rev. 374. On the power
to abandon unprofitable lines as a right under the Fourteenth Amendment see Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Commission, (1920)_ 251
U. S. 396, 40 Sup. Ct. 183, 64 L. Ed. 323, and Railroad Commission
v. Eastern Texas R. Co., (1924) 264 U. S. 79, 44 Sup. Ct. 247, 68
L. Ed. 569.
Discussions of the problem appear in Charles Willis
Needham, "The Rights of the States and Adjacent Owners of Property in the Maintenance and Operation of a Railroad," 32 Yale L. J.
247, 80and a note in 32 Yale L. J. 35.
A decree of the district court enjoining a state Corporation
Commission from making or enforcing any order restraining an interstate railroad from removing its shops to another location or changing
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State laws prescribing cab curtains and automatic doors to the
firebox of locomotives were held in Napier v.Atlantic Coast Line
R. Co."' to be precluded from applying to locomotives on highways of interstate commerce because Congress by the Boiler Inspection Act had conferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission full power to prescribe the equipment of locomotives on
such highways and this legislation was thought to manifest an
intention to occupy the entire field of regulating locomotive equipment. To the argument that the federal regulation was aimed
to prevent accidents from the operation of trains while the state
laws sought to prevent sickness and disease due to exposure, Mr.
Justice Brandeis answered:
"The federal and state statutes are directed to the same subject-the equipment of locomotives. They operate upon the same
object. It is suggested that the power delegated to the Commission has been exerted only in respect to minor changes or additions. But this, if true, is not of legal significance. It is also
urged that, even if the Commission has power to prescribe an
automatic firebox door and a cab curtain, it has not done so, and
that it has made no other requirement inconsistent with the state
legislation. This, also, if true, is without legal significance. The
fact that the Commission has not seen fit to exercise its authority to
the full extent conferred, has no bearing on the construction of
its division point was reversed in Lawrence v. St. Louis-San Francisco
Ry. Co., (1927) 274 U. S. 588, 47 Sup. Ct. 720, 71 L. Ed. 1219, chiefly
for the reason that there appeared to be no danger of irreparable
injury and thus no reason why an injunction should issue. The state
statute forbade the removal of the shops without the consent of the
state commission. Just what the court thought of this must be
gathered from the following extract from the opinion of Mr. Justice
Brandeis:
"We have no occasion to determine whether the Oklahoma Act
is obnoxious to the federal constitution. But, as bearing upon the
propriety of issuing the temporary injunction, the fact is important
that the controversy concerns the respective powers of the nation
and of the states over railroads engaged in interstate commerce. Such
railroads are subject to regulation by both the state and the United
States. The delimitation of the respective powers of the two governments requires often nice adjustments. The federal power is paramount. But public interest demands that, whenever possible, conflict
between the two authorities and irritation be avoided. To this end
it is important that the federal power be not exerted unuecessarily,
hastily, or harshly. It is important, also, that the demands of comity
and courtesy, as well as of the law, be deferred to. .

.

. To require

that the regulating body of the state be advised of a proposed change
seriously affecting transportation conditions is not such an obvious
interference with interstate commerce that, on application for a preliminary injunction, the Act should lightly be assumed to be beyond
the power of the state."
81(1927) 272 U. S. 605, 47 Sup. Ct. 207, 71 L. Ed. 432, noted in
21 Ill.
L. Rev. 815. A state case on state power over locomotive
equipment is considered in 39 Harv. L. Rev. 395.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

the Act delegating the power. We hold that state legislation is
precluded, because the Boiler Inspection Act, as we construe it,
was intended to occupy the field. The broad scope of the authority
conferred upon the Commission leads to that conclusion. Because
the standard set by the Commission must prevail, requirements by
the states are precluded, however commendable or different their
purpose."8' 2
Actions and Liabilities. A cause of action under the Carmack
Amendment for damages to an interstate shipment may be brought
in a state court, since Congress merely created the rule of liability and did not make the jurisdiction of the federal courts exclusive. One of the questions in Missouri ex rel. St. Louis,
Brownsville & Mexico Rcilway Co. v. Taylor8 3 was whether a
state action could be maintained when the federal court of that
district could not have been used because the defendant could not
be served with process. The reasons for the affirmative answer
were stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis as follows:
"The origin of the right does nQt affect the manner of administering the remedy. The grant of concurrent jurisdiction implies
that, in the first instance, the plaintiff shall have the choice of the
court. As an incident, he is entitled to whatever remedial advantage inheres in the particular forum . .

.

. No peculiarity of

state procedure will be permitted to enlarge or to abridge a substantive federal right .

. .

. But to enforce a claim by subject-

ing property within the state to its satisfaction, through attachment
proceeding, does not enlarge the substantive right.
"The practice of obtaining in this way satisfaction of a claim
in personam against an absent defendant is not one abhorrent to,
or uncommon in, federal courts. In admiralty, district courts
take original jurisdiction under such circumstances .

.

.

. At

law, they do so on removal. When the case is removed, it proceeds to judgment in the federal court and the judgment is enforced there as against the attached property with the same effect
as if the cause had remained in the state court."
A question as to the liability of an interstate carrier as
garnishee in proceedings served after the interstate transit was
82
The opinion pointed out that the laws of the state had not been
rendered inapplicable by the Safety Appliance Act, since its require-

ments are specific, nor by the original Boiler Inspection Act, since
its provisions are limited to the boiler. Earlier Mr. Justice Brandeis
had said that there was no physical conflict between the devices required by the state and those prescribed by federal authority and
that the state interference with interstate commerce would be only
incidental, and he added that "the intention of Congress to exclude
states from exerting their police power must be clearly manifested."
For want bf a better place, mention may here be made of a note
in 9 MrEN ~ESOrA LAw Ravmw 473 on a case holding that the states have lost
the power to supervise the issue of securities by interstate carriers.
83(1924) 266 U. S. 200, 45 Sup. Ct. 47, 69 L. Ed. 247.
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over and after surrender of the bill of lading and payment of the
freight and while the car was being unloaded by the consignee
arose in Chicago & N. W. R. Ca. v. Durham Co. 4 in which the
state court had held the carrier liable for the reason that the federal Act regulating liabilities under bills of lading continued the
liability for forty-eight hours after notice to the consignee of the
arrival of the car. In reversing the state court Mr. Justice
Brandeis pointed out that the federal Act was confined to the
liability of the carrier to the consignee or persons privy to him
and had nothing to do with liabilities to strangers. Neither did
the bill of lading apply in any way to garnishment of the consignment by strangers. The case was therefore sent back to the state
court to determine whether under the law of the state the garnishment proceedings were proper and bound the carrier to satisfy the
plaintiff for its failure to stop the unloading of the car upon service of the garnishment or attachment process.
While Congress has from time to time set limits to the stipulations which carriers may impose on the bringing of actions
against them, Mr. Justice McReynolds in Louisiana & W. R. Co.
v. Gardiner" declares that it has not itself passed any general
statute of limitations for actions against carriers. The state court
had thought that state laws limiting the time within which actions
may be brought had been superseded by the Carmack Amendment
and so had denied to the carrier the benefit of the state statute.
The carrier who thus unsuccessfully relied on state law took the
case to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The carrier could not
rely on its stipulation in the bill of lading, because the action was
brought within the time therein specified. Moreover the Supreme
Court held the stipulation invalid because more drastic than that
permitted by the Transportation Act. Apparently, however, the
stipulation had lured the shipper to sleep on his rights longer than
the state law allowed and the state court was told by the Supreme
Court that there was no federal bar to the application of the state
statute.
A state cause of action against an interstate carrier, completely
barred by a state statute of limitations prior to the federal Transportation Act, which declared that the period of federal control
should not be computed as part of the periods of limitation in
actions against carriers, was held in Fullerton-KruegerLumber
84(1926) 271 U. S. 251, 46 Sup. Ct. 509, 70 L. Ed. 931.
85(1927) 273 U. S. 280, 47 Sup. Ct. 386, 71 L. Ed. 644, discussed in
26 Mich. L. Rev. 201.
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Co. v. Northern Pacific Railvay Co.8 6 not to be revived by the

Transportation Act, since its provision is to be construed
prospectively as merely an extension of periods not yet fully run
and not as a reviver of barred claims.
I So where an action is barred by a valid stipulation in a bill of
lading, Leigh Ellis & Co. v. Davis8 7 holds that this valid stipulation is not overridden by the Transportation Act, the general purpose of which "was to limit, not to extend, rights of action." With
the Transportation Act out of the way, the two-year limitation in
the stipulation was held a reasonable one that must be given effect
to, since the application of state statutes to the validity of such
stipulations has been precluded by the Carmack Amendment.
The provision in the Transportation Act fixing a two-year
limitation to the bringing of suits against the agent designated
by the president on causes of action arising during the operation
of the road under federal control was successfully adduced in
Davis v. Cohen & C&.88 to defeat an amendment allowed by the
Massachusetts court which substituted the federal agent as defendant in place of the carrier who was the original party defendant.
The amendment sanctioned by the state court was said by Mr.
Justice Sanford to be "in effect, the commencement of a new
and independent proceeding to enforce" the liability of the federal
agent and to be void because not within the period during which
the government had consented to be sued after the termination of
federal control. Technically the case goes on the ground that
the government cannot be sued without its consent, but it shows
how a federal statute passed in the exercise of a combination of
war power and commerce power may defeat the application of
state power over amendments to causes of action.
In several cases the question was whether an attempted or
desired application of state rules of liability was precluded because Congress had taken the subject matter under federal
control.
The previously established rule that the liability for loss of
interstate shipments is now subject to federal law s9 found appli86(1925) 266 U. S. 435, 45 Sup. Ct. 143, 69 L. Ed. 367.
87(1923) 260 U. S. 682, 43 Sup. Ct; 243, 67 L. Ed. 460.
88(1925) 268 U. S. 638, 45 Sup. Ct. 633, 69 L. Ed. 1129.
89This was first laid down in Adams Express Co. v. Croninger,

(1913) 226 U. S. 491, 33 Sup. Ct. 148, 57 L. Ed. 314, reviewed in 22
Colum. L. Rev. 31-32, and discussed in 1 Georg. L. J. 169; 26 Harv.
L. Rev. 456; 8 Ill. L. Rev. 123; 11 Mich. L. Rev. 460; 61 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 501; and 18 Va. L. Reg. 705. The federal law is not prescribed
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cation in American Railway Express Co v. Levee9" in which a
limitation of liability sanctioned by such federal law was held
not subject to be defeated by the application by the state court
of a state statute imposing on the carrier the burden of proving
that the damage had been occasioned by accidental and uncontrollable events. For failure to offer such proof the carrier had
been treated by the state court as though it had conceded that it
had converted the property to its own use. This, declared Mr.
Justice Holmes, narrowed the protection that the defendant had
secured by a stipulation valid by federal law and therefore contravened the federal law.
Similarly in American Railway Express Co. v. Lindenburg9'
an interstate shipper who had recovered in the state court his
full loss, notwithstanding a provision in a receipt limiting liability
except when the value was declared and excess charges paid,
learned from the Supreme Court that his case was governed by
the Cummins Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act. The
only question debated by the court was whether the applicable
federal rule rendered the stipulation valid. The receipt was not
in the precise words authorized by the Interstate Commerce
Commission and it was on an old form that contained some
stipulations concededly invalid. These, however, were declared
by Mr. Justice Sutherland to be separable and to have no effect
on the valid stipulation involved in the case. The absence of
proof that the petitioner had been required or authorized to
establish rates dependent upon declared or agreed values was
found not controlling in view of the fact that such rates had
been duly filed with the Commission and of the presumption that
this was done under the authority of the Commission. The point
relied on by the state court that the shipper had not signed the
receipt given him was held not material since neither the federal
statute nor the order of the Commission required such signature.
The shipper by receiving and acting upon the receipt was declared to have assented to its terms and by accepting the lower
in detail by Congress but consists to a large extent of those principles
of general jurisprudence pleasing to the Supreme Court of the United
States, but not of course to be confounded with the non-existent
common law of the United States.
00(1923) 263 U. S. 19, 44 Sup. Ct. 11, 68 L. Ed. 140, discussed in
23 Mich. L. Rev. 160 and 33 Yale L. J. 309.
91(1923) 260 U. S. 584, 43 Sup. Ct. 206, 67 L. Ed. 414, considered
in 32 Yale L. J. 500 and cited in a note in 12 Va. L. Rev. 235.
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rate dependent upon the specified valuation was said to be estopped
92
from asserting a higher value.
The Carmack Amendment, making carriers liable for delivery
without surrender of the bill of lading was unsuccessfully relied
on by a shipper in City National Bank v. El Paso & Northeastern
Railway Co.93 because the Supreme Court held that it had no

application to a situation where the jury was justified in finding
that the shipper had authorized delivery to some one other than
the consignee named in the bill of lading. While Mr. Justice
Butler says that "the provisions of the Carmack Amendment
have no application," this should very likely be taken to mean
that those provisions were in substance duly complied with, since
he' declared that under the circumstances the "delivery to the
commission company was delivery to the consignee bank." It
certainly must be federal rather than state law which forgave a
technical non-compliance with the interstate bill of lading.
A state statute forbidding limitation of liability was held in
Lancaster v. McCarty94 to be inapplicable to an intrastate shipment in the territory covered by the Shreveport Rate Case"5 under
which the carriers put into effect the federal rates and classifications as a permitted method of complying with the mandate of
that case to bring intrastate and interstate rates to the same
level in order to prevent discrimination against interstate com2
0 A lady who had recovered in a state court a judgment against
an initial carrier for an assault on her by an employee of a subsequent
connecting carrier, notwithstanding a stipulation on the ticket that
the selling carrier acts only as agent and is not responsible beyond
its own lines, suffered a reversal of the judgment in Missouri Pacific
Railroad Co. v. Prude, (1924) 265 U. S.99, 44 Sup. Ct. 450, 67 L. Ed.
919, on the ground that the stipulation was valid and that mere
failure to read it cannot overcome the presumption of assent. Mr.
Justice McReynolds refers to no Act of Congress in deciding the
point, but some federal right must have been in issue or certiorari
to the state court would not have been granted. Presumably the
case means that Congress is silent as to the responsibility pf the
initial carrier to passengers injured by connecting -carriers, but has
taken sufficient control of the general subject matter to permit the
Supreme Court to pick what it regards as the appropriate rule of
liability.
93(1923) 262 U. S.695, 43 Sup. Ct. 640, 67 L. Ed. 1184.
94(1925) 267 U. S. 427, 45 Sup. Ct. 342, 69 L. Ed. 696, discussed
in 9 Mich.
L. Rev. 571 and 3 Tex. L. Rev. 472.
O5Houston, East & West Texas Railway Co. v. United States,
(1914) 234 U. S. 342, 34 Sup. Ct. 833, 58 L. Ed. 1341, reviewed in
22 Colum. L. Rev. 37 and 6 M=XESOrA LAW REvmEw 3, and discuss ed
in Henry Wolf Bikl6, "Federal Control of Intrastate Railroad Rates,"
63 U. Pa. L. Rev. 69; William C. Coleman, "The Evolution of Federal
Regulation of Intrastate Rates," 28 Harv. L. Rev. 34; John S.
'Sheppard, Jr., "Another Word About the Evolution of the Federal
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merce in favor of intrastate commerce competing against it because of the competition between communities in Texas and
communities across the line in Louisiana. Mr. Chief Justice Taft
observes that such an order to end the discrimination against
extra-state points "of course included classification as well as
rates," since "the two are so bound together in the regulation of
interstate commerce that the effect of both must be reasonable
and without undue discrimination." Thus an important point of
law was settled in a suit in which the shipper who had recovered
$198 under the state statute prohibiting limitation of liability
learned from the United States Supreme Court that the federal
rules permitting limitation when there is a choice of rates applied
to intrastate shipments in his particular portion of Texas so that
he would have to be satisfied with something around $60. The
state court had also allowed an attorney's fee of $20 for the
delay of the carrier in paying the claim, but this is not considered
in the opinion of the Chief Justice. The significance of the case
is greatly enhanced by the fact that the Transportation Act of
1920 puts intrastate rates under federal control to the extent
necessary to prevent discrimination generally against interstate
commerce in favor of intrastate commerce and not merely against
special localities.96
Regulation of Intrastate Rates and the Shreveport Cases," 28 Harv.
L. Rev. 294; and notes in 79 Cent. L. J. 1; 2 Calif. L. Rev. 482; 14
Colum. L. Rev. 583, 607; 28 Harv. L. Rev. 113; 9 Ill. L. Rev. 276;
and 1 St. Louis L. Rev. 267. The decision in the Commerce Court
is discussed in William C. Coleman, "The Vanishing Rate-making
Power of the States," 14 Colum. L. Rev. 122; and a note in 26 Harv.
L. Rev. 757. National power over intrastate rates is discussed also
in Henry C. Flannery, "Constitutional and Practical Objections to,
the Exclusive Federal Regulation of Intrastate Railroad Rates," 2
MINNEsoTA LAW Rzv-aw 339; William E. Lamb, "Legal Questions
Involved in Nationalization of Rate Regulation," 76 Ann. Amer. Acad.
Pol. and Soc. Science (No. 165) 239 (March, 1918); J. A. Little, "The
Point Now Reached in the Federal Regulation of Intrastate Rates,"
76 Ann. Amer. Acad. Pol. and Soc. Science (No. 165) 202 (March,
1918); Charles Willis Needham, "Exclusive Regulation of Railroad
Rates96 by the Federal Government," 2 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 163.
For the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission over
intrastate rates under the Transportation Act see Railroad Commission
of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., (1922) 257 U. S. 563, 42
Sup. Ct. 232, 66 L. Ed. 371, reviewed in 21 Mich. L. Rev. 177 and
discussed in 10 Georg. L. J. 78; 35 Harv. L. Rev. 864, 886; 20 Mich.
L. Rev. 675; 6 MINNESTA LAW REviEw 520; 8 Va. L. Rev. 615; and
31 Yale L. J. 870. The case is followed in New York v. United States,
(1922) 257 U. S. 591, 42 Sup. Ct. 239; 66 L. Ed. 385. Prior to the
decisions in the Supreme Court the problem was treated in Minor
Bronough, "Federal Control of Intrastate Rates," 24 Law Notes 187;
and notes in 6 Cornell L. Q. 412; 21 Colum. L. Rev. 352; and 69
U. Pa. L. Rev. 262.
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A stipulation in a bill of lading exempting. the carrier from
liability for loss by fire was held in Missouri Pacific R. Co. v.
Porter97 to be immune from condemnation by a state statute for
the reason that Congress had taken the general matter of liability
under federal control and no federal action required the stipulation to be disregarded. The shipment was to a non-adjacent
foreign country in presumably a foreign vessel and was not
within the provisions of any federal enactment specifically referring to bills of lading or liabilities thereunder. The carriers
were, however, under the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce
Commission which was empowered when of opinion that any
of their regulations or practices are unjust or unreasonable to
determine and prescribe what is just, fair and reasonable. Apparently the Commission had taken no notice of such a stipulation
with regard to loss by fire, for Mr. Justice Butler makes no
mention of any Commission action. In reversing the judgment
of the state court which held the stipulation invalid under state
law he says:
"Section 1 (6) extends to all carriers and to all transportation subject to the. act; it prescribes a general rule applicable to
all regulations and practices affecting the form or substance of
bills of lading in order that they may be just and reasonable.
And the commission is empowered and directed to enforce the
rule.
"The general regulation of the 'issuance, form, and substance'
of bills of lading is broad enough to cover contractual provisions like the one involved in this case, exempting railroads from
liability for loss of shippers' property by fire. Congress must
be deemed to have determined that the rule laid down and the
means provided to enforce it are sufficient and that no other
regulation is necessary. Its power to regulate such commerce
and all its instrumentalities is supreme; and, as that power has
been exerted, state laws have no application. They cannot be
applied in coincidence with, as complementary to or in opposition
to, federal enactments which disclose the intention of Congress
to enter a field of regulation that is within its jurisdiction."
A lady who rode on a free pass from a point in Kansas to
her destination in Missouri was injured and secured a judgment
against the railroad in the Missouri court notwithstanding a
97(1927) 273 U. S. 388, 47 Sup. Ct. 383, 71 L. Ed. 699, discussed
in 25 Mich. L. Rev. 902. The case is cited in 37 Harv. L. Rev. 888,
919, in discussions of the application of the Interstate Commerce
Act to foreign commerce.
On the limitation of liability on interstate telegraph messages see
a note in 1 Tex. L. Rev. 326.
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provision in the pass stipulating that the user assumes all risk
of accident. Congress by the Hepburn Act had specifically regulated the giving of interstate passes, to the extent of prohibiting
them, subject to certain exceptions of which the issue in issue
was one. The Missouri court was of opinion that the Hepburn
Act went no farther than its terms and did not regulate the rights
and liabilities of the parties in case of travel on a permitted pass,
thus leaving them subject to state law, which in the present case
invalidated the stipulation. The Supreme Court, however, in
98
Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v. Van Zant thought differently and held that the whole subject of interstate passes wastaken over by the federal statute, thus leaving the Supreme Court
free to apply its preferred rules of liability to the exclusion of
rules of state statutes or state courts. Its choice was for a rule
that bound the recipient of the gift to its terms. As Mr. Justice
McKenna puts it:
"The provision for passes, with its sanction in penalties, is a
regulation of interstate commerce, to the completion of which the
determination of the effect of the passes is necessary. We think,
therefore, free passes in their entirety are taken charge of, not
only their permission and use, but the limitations and conditions
on their use; or to put it in another way, and to specialize, the
relation of their users to the railroad which issued them, the fact
and measure of the responsibility the railroad incurs by their
issue, and the extent of the right the person to whom issued
acquires, are taken charge of. And that responsibility and those
rights, this court has decided, the railroad company can control
by conditions in the passes."
Congressional regulation of the duty of interstate carriers to
furnish cars on demand was held in Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.
v. Stroud9 to preclude the application of a state statute giving
damages to shippers discriminated against in the matter of cars
where the cars were desired for a haul between two points in
the state but would have passed through part of another state
en route. The company had two routes, one of which was wholly
within the state. The shipper did not designate either route. as
the one desired. The railroad's superintendent of transportation
testified that, under routing instructions in force at the time of
the demand, the cars, if furnished, would have been hauled over
the route partly in another state. This was the more level line
98(1923) 260 U. S. 459, 43 Sup. Ct. 176, 67 L. Ed. 348, discussed
in 23 Colum. L. Rev. 576.
99(1925) 267 U. S. 404, 45 Sup. Ct. 243, 69 L. Ed. 683.
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of the two and was preferred as a matter of operating convenience
and ecenomy. Mr. Justice Butler observed that "the record discloses no facts which would impose upon petitioner any obligation
to haul respondent's lumber over the intrastate route," thus leaving open the question whether the shipper might have acquired a
right of action under the state statute by calling for cars for
shipment over that route.
An employee of an interstate carrier who had recovered in
the state court a judgment on the theory that the state law applied
suffered a reversal in Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern Railroad
Co. v. Burtch 00 because the Supreme Court found that the uncontradicted evidence was that the freight being unloaded at the
time of the injury had come directly from without the state. It
held that the loading and unloading is so closely connected with
the transportation as to be practically a part of it. It was the
carrier that contended that the action should be tried under the
federal Employers' Liability Act which allowed it certain defences
not open under the state law. Thus does the advance step taken
by Congress on behalf of injured railway employees become in
0
time a laggard behind the law of a state. 11
100(1924) 263 U.

S. 540, 44 Sup. Ct. 165, 68 L. Ed. 433.
For cases holding that state law is inapplicable to injuries within
the scope of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, even though that
Act gives no recovery for such injuries, see 22 Colum. L. Rev. 38-42.
That the federal Act similarly precludes the application of state
workmen's laws see New York Central R. R. Co. v. Winfield,
(1917) 244 U. S. 147, 37 Sup. Ct. 346, 61 L. Ed. 1045, considered in
85 Cent. L. J. 37; 3 Cornell L. Q. 45; 2 MINNESOTA LAW RmEw 49,
55; 3 Va. L. Reg. n. s. 295; and 27 Yale L. J. 135. To the same
effect is Erie Railroad v. Winfield, (1917) 244 U. S. 170, 37 Sup. Ct.
556, 61 L. Ed. 1057. For discussions prior to the Supreme Court
decision see James Harrington Boyd, "The Conflict of Jurisdiction
Between the State Legislature and the Congress of the United States
in the Enactment of Workmen's Compensation Acts by the States
and the Federal Employers' Liability Act of 1898," 25 Yale L. J.
548; W. W. Thornton, "Interstate Railroad Employees and Workmen's Compensation Acts," 82 Cent. L. J. 281; and notes in 82 Cent.
L. J. 43; 16 Colum. L. Rev. 254; 1 Cornell L. .Q. 272; 29 Harv. L.
Rev. 439, 459; 19 Law Notes 83; 14 Mich. L. Rev. 527; 1 St. Louis
L. Rev. 52; and 64 U. Pa. L. Rev. 304.
101 In Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Schendel, (1926) 270 U. S.
611, 46 Sup. Ct. 420, 70 L. Ed. 757, a judgment obtained in a state
court in an action founded on the federal Employers' Liability Law
on the theory that the plaintiff's intestate had been engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the fatality was reversed by the .Supreme
Court on the ground that the state court had erroneously refused to
hold the action barred by an award against the carrier under the
Workmen's Compensation Act of another state on the theory that
the deceased was engaged in intrastate commerce when he met with
the accident which caused his death. It was the carrier which had
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That the issue of negligence under the federal Employers'
Liability Act may depend upon violation of a state statute regulating the conduct of trains at track intersections appears from
Frese v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.10 2 which sustained the Missouri
supreme court in the holding that violation by a deceased engineer
of an Illinois statute was contributory negligence defeating the
action of his representative under the Employers' Liability Act.
The statute in question required engineers on trains approaching
other trains at grade crossings to stop and "positively ascertain
that the way is clear and that the train can safely resume its
course before proceeding to pass." 103
2. NAVIGABLE WATERS
Diversion of water from the Great Lakes in excess of the
amount permitted by the secretary of war under an Act of
Congress forbidding diminution of navigable capacity of navigable
waters without his consent was enjoined upon petition of the
04
United States in Sanitary District of Chicago v. United States1
in reliance on the long-established principle that Congress has a
paramount power to regulate diversion of water which affects
the navigability of streams and lakes on which interstate transportation is possible, and that no state can authorize any diversion
forbidden by Congress.

The situation involved was one of tre-

initiated the Compensation proceeding after the bringing of the suit
against it under the federal Act and secured a final award against
itself before the rendition of the judgment in the judicial proceeding
under the federal Act. It was held that each court had jurisdiction
and that the first final decision is a bar to the prosecution of the
other proceeding even though that decision is one that the Supreme
Court might have held to be erroneous if properly before it for review.
In another suit disposed of in the same opinion, the decision in the
workmen's compensation proceeding had not ripened into an enforceable award and so was held not a bar to the judgment rendered
under the federal Employers' Liability Act.
For a note criticizing an earlier contrary decision in another case
in the circuit court of appeals, see 37 Harv. L. Rev. 778.
102(1923) 263 U. S. 1, 44 Sup. Ct. 1, 68 L. Ed. 131, discussed in
9 Va.0 3L. Reg. n. s. 618.
1 For discussion of cases on the question whether the employee
was engaged in interstate or intrastate commerce at the time of his
injury, see 21 Mich. L. Rev. 357; 12 MINNFSOrA LAw REVIEw 492, 499,
548; 71 U. Pa. L. Rev. 283, 292; 9 Va. L Rev. 653; 10 Va. L. Rev.
647; 33 Yale L. J. 447.
In 8 MINXESOTA LAW REVIEW 252 is a discussion of the right to bring
suit in Minnesota under the Employers' Liability Law against a corporation
doing business in Minnesota for a death in Wisconsin; in 3 Neb. L. B. 294
a consideration of the application of state workmen's compensation laws to
employees of interstate railroads.
304(1925) 266 U. S. 405, 45 Sup. Ct. 176, 69 L. Ed. 352.
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mendous practical importance, but the constitutional issue was
so simple that it is amazing that Chicago succeeded so many years
in doing what it should not have done. Judge Landis prolonged
the wrongful diversion by keeping the case for about six years
before he rendered an oral opinion in favor of the United States
and against the Sanitary District. The Supreme Court heard the
arguments on December 8 and 9, 1924, and handed down its
opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes on January 5, 1925. The opinion
deals mainly with the recital of the facts and the review of the
Acts of Congress and of the secretary of war which were
.absurdly adduced by the District as warrant for its action. As
-to these Mr. Justice Holmes observed that "it appears to us that
the attempt to found a defense upon the foregoing licenses is
-too futile to need reply." He points out that the United States
,could not be estopped in matters of national and international
-concern and that any approval given to diversion is subject to
withdrawal. "The investment of property in the canal and the
accompanying works took the risk that Congress might- render
it valueless by the exercise of paramount powers."
The ruling that New Jersey had authorized the construction
-of the railroad bridge across Newark Bay settled the main points
-of the controversy involved in Newark v. Central Railroad Co.,10 5
but the opinion of Mr. Justice Butler declares broadly that it
-was within the power of the state to authorize its construction.
'Inquiry into the question whether the interstate navigation on
the water below was unreasonably interfered with was rendered
unnecessary by the fact that the secretary of war under authority
from Congress had approved of the proposed structure. Possibly
ralso the fact that the complainants were New Jersey municipalities
might have been ehough to hold that they would be bound by
:any approval of the state. 10
3. QUARANTINE

A quarantine regulation of the State of Washington forbidding the introduction of hay and meal from specified areas
in other states known to be entertaining the "alfalfa weevil,"
267 U. S. 377, 45 Sup. Ct. 328, 69 L. Ed. 666.
100For. discussion of issues with regard to navigable waters see
-Paxton Blair, "Federal Bridge Legislation and the Constitution," 36
Yale L. J.808; Merritt Starr, "Navigable Waters of the United States105(1925)

State and National Control," 35 Harv. L. Rev. 154; and a note in 2

Wis. L. Rev. 488 on interference with navigable waters of the United.
.States by a state drainage project.
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scientifically known as the "phytonomus posticus," was declared
unconstitutional in Oregon-Washington Railroad & Navigation
Co. v. Washington10 7 on the ground that Congress by vesting in
the secretary of agriculture the power to impose such a quarantine
had taken over the field and thereby precluded the application
of state laws to interstate commerce. Mr. Chief Justice Taft
quotes the federal statute at length and differentiates cases relied
on by the state and insists that, since "the obligation to act without respect to the states is put directly upon the secretary of
agriculture whenever quarantine, in his judgment, is necessary,"
it follows that "when he does not act, it must be presumed that
it is not necessary." In a dissent in which Mr. Justice Sutherland
joined, Mr. Justice McReynolds declared:
"We cannot think Congress intended that the Act of March
4, 1917, without more, should deprive the states of power to
protect themselves against threatened disaster like the one disclosed by this record.
"If the secretary of agriculture had taken some affirmative
action the problem would be a very different one. Congress could
have exerted all the power which this statute delegated to him
by positive and direct enactment. If it had said nothing whatever certainly the state could have resorted to the quarantine;
and this same right, we think, should be recognized when 'its
agent does nothing.
"It is a serious thing to paralyze the efforts of a state to protect her people against impending calamity, and leave them to
the slow charity of a far-off and perhaps supine federal bureau.
No such purpose should be attributed to Congress unless indicated
beyond reasonable doubt."108
4. VESSELS

A statute of New York regulating conditional sales of goods
and chattels was applied in James Stewart & Co. v. Rivara1 9 in
107(1926) 270 U. S.87, 46 Sup. Ct. 279, 70 L. Ed. 482, discussed
in 5 0Oreg. L. Rev. 330 and 74 U. Pa. L. Rev. 852.
1 8Objectors to the Massachusetts Daylight Saving Act conceived
the idea that it was unconstitutional because inconsistent with the
Federal Standard Time Act which fixes the standard time of the zone
in which the act is to be performed as the time specified in any federal
statute relating to the time within which any act shall or shall not
be performed by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States, but Mr. Justice Holmes told them in Massachusetts State
Grange v. Benton, (1926) 272 U. S. 525, 47 Sup. Ct. 189, 71 L. Ed. 387,
that "the court below found no inconsistency between the two Acts
and we have seen no sufficient reason for differing from it upon that
point." The rest of the opinion tells why the case was not one in
which injunctive relief should be granted against the state attorney
general even though in a technical sense the district court had jurisdiction.
The decision in the circuit court of appeals is discussed in 30 Law Notes 64.
109(1927) 274 U. S.614, 47 Sup. Ct. 718, 71 L. Ed. 1234.
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a suit by a defaulting conditional vendee of a vessel documented
as a vessel of the United States and enrolled for the coasting
trade and operated in interstate and intrastate commerce. The
contract was made before the passage of the Jones Act of 1920,
but the vendor contended that the earlier Enrollment Act and
the Recording Act had created a form of property known as
"vessels of the United States" and brought such property within
exclusive federal jurisdiction under the commerce clause. Mr.
Justice Butler pointed out that the Recording Act does not affect
the title as between vendee and vendor and that the Enrollment
Act gives the privilege of being American vessels, but has nothing
in it inconsistent with the state regulation of conditional sales.
The state law required that property retaken by the vendor should
be retained for thirty days during which time the vendee may
comply with his contract and secure the return of the property,
but Mr. Justice Butler declared that the enforcement of this
would not require the vessel to be withdrawn from service in
interstate commerce and said that, even if it did, "the law would
not for that reason be invalid." The contention that during this
thirty-day period persons having claims against the vessel cannot
proceed in rem to enforce their maritime liens was put to one
sid by saying that no such rights of third persons were in issue
and that it would be time' en6ugh to consider them when they
were. The vendor had previously obtained possession of the
vessels in admiralty proceedings, subject to any rights of the
vendee under the state statute, so that the present proceedings
involved no question of state interference with the admiralty
jurisdiction of the federal courts.
5. CONCLUSION

In the twenty-nine cases reviewed in the text, state law was
allowed application ten times. In two of the ten cases the state
court had modestly declined to apply state law and was reversed
on certiorari. One case reversed a decree of a federal district
court enjoining a state prescription of intrastate rates. The other
seven cases sustained a district court, a circuit court of appeals
and five decrees of state courts. There were nineteen cases in
which state law was not applied, though in four or five of them
the dispute seemed to be confined to the choice of the appropriate
federal rule. These nineteen cases involved twenty cases from
lower courts, in which there were seven affirmances and thirteen
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reversals. Circuit courts of appeals were sustained once and
reversed once; district courts were sustained three times; state
courts were sustained three times and reversed twelve times. In
the thirty cases coming from lower courts, there were sixteen
reversals and fourteen affirmances. Circuit courts of appeals
were reversed once and sustained twice; district courts were reversed once and affirmed four times; state courts were poor
prophets in fourteen cases and good prophets in eight cases. Of
the twenty-two cases coming from state courts, fourteen came up
by certiorari and yielded eight reversals. This takes no account of
cases in-which certiorari was asked for and denied.
This disagreement between the Supreme Court and lower
courts in sixteen out of thirty cases contrasts markedly with the
paucity of dissent in the Supreme Court. The only important
dissent was that of Justices McReynolds and Sutherland in protest against the proscription of a state quarantine law. The only
other dissent was that of Mr. Justice McReynolds who found
two journeys where his colleagues found but one. In these two
cases the dissenters agreed with the courts below. Twenty-seven
unanimous Supreme Court decisions carried with them fourteen
reversals of lower courts. This suggests that Congress does not
speak with stentorian voice in announcing when it means its prescriptions to be a negative on state additions or amendments. An
examination of the cases in detail reveals that to a considerable
degree the judicial function in determining how far Congress
has gone is akin to the legislative function of deciding how far
it is desirable to restrict state power when federal power is at
work in the vicinage. When such issues are presented, it is not
surprising that lower courts often fail to prognosticate the prospective legislative judgment of their superior. Nor is the
unanimity which prevails in the superior collective mind a sure
indication that the issues are free from doubt. Rumor has it
that preliminary doubts expressed in conference are frequently
not pressed to the point of open dissent. This deference to
majority judgment may very well find most frequent expression
in such a field as that here surveyed, in which the primary
desideratum is to have a settled rule or dictate rather than to be
sure that the legislative mind has been correctly divined.
This enterprise of pricking out the dividing line between state
and national power is essentially a governmental one. The final
authority in the process is a governmental agency, though not an
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executive or legislative one. This agency, however, depends for
stimulation and guidance upon litigants who appear before it.
A roster of the litigants in the twenty-nine cases here reviewed
reveals that in twenty-two cases both plaintiff and defendant were
individuals or private corporations, if we include one case in which
a city was seeking to protect proprietary interests. Five cases
were suits between states and carriers, and two cases were between
governmental agencies of the states and of the United States.
To a large extent, then, our public issues in this field are settled in
private litigation. The parties are striving for the rule that is
favorable to their private interests in the particular controversy,
and the fact that one is urging a federal rule and the other a state
rule is from one aspect merely incidental. Advocates may argue
in terms of statesmanship but they do not choose their positions
from considerations of statesmanship. This contrast between
good reasons and real reasons is not necessarily peculiar to the
settlement of public issues by litigation. It may perhaps occasionally find parallels in constitutional and political advocacy
which seeks solace from a legislature or an electorate.

